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Summary
Progress in science often begins with
verbal hypotheses meant to explain why
certain biological phenomena exist. An
important purpose of mathematical models
in evolutionary research, as in many other
fields, is to act as ‘‘proof-of-concept’’ tests of
the logic in verbal explanations, paralleling
the way in which empirical data are used to
test hypotheses. Because not all subfields of
biology use mathematics for this purpose,
misunderstandings of the function of proof-
of-concept modeling are common. In the
hope of facilitating communication, we
discuss the role of proof-of-concept model-
ing in evolutionary biology.
A Conceptual Gap: Models and
Misconceptions
Recent advances in many fields of
biology have been driven by a synergistic
approach involving observation, experi-
ment, and mathematical modeling (see,
e.g., [1]). Evolutionary biology has long
required this approach, due in part to the
complexity of population-level processes
and to the long time scales over which
evolutionary processes occur. Indeed, the
‘‘modern evolutionary synthesis’’ of the
1930s and 40s—a pivotal moment of
intellectual convergence that first recon-
ciled Mendelian genetics and gene frequen-
cy change with natural selection—hinged
on elegant mathematical work by RA
Fisher, Sewall Wright, and JBS Haldane.
Formal (i.e., mathematical) evolutionary
theory has continued to mature; models
can now describe how evolutionary change
is shaped by genome-scale properties such
as linkage and epistasis [2,3], complex
demographic variability [4], environmental
variability [5], and individual and social
behavior [6,7] within and between species.
Despite their integral role in evolution-
ary biology, the purpose of certain types of
mathematical models is often questioned
[8]. Some view models as useful only
insofar as they generate immediately
testable quantitative predictions [9], and
others see them as tools to elaborate
empirically-derived biological patterns
but not to independently make substantial
new advances [10]. Doubts about the
utility of mathematical models are not
limited to present day studies of evolu-
tion—indeed, this is a topic of discussion
in many fields including ecology [11,12],
physics [13], and economics [14], and has
been debated in evolution previously [15].
We believe that skepticism about the value
of mathematical models in the field of
evolution stems from a common misun-
derstanding regarding the goals of partic-
ular types of models. While the connection
between empiricism and some forms of
theory (e.g., the construction of likelihood
functions for parameter inference and
model choice) is straightforward, the
importance of highly abstract models—
which might not make immediately test-
able predictions—can be less evident
to empiricists. The lack of a shared
understanding of the purpose of these
‘‘proof-of-concept’’ models represents a
roadblock for progress and hinders dia-
logue between scientists studying the same
topics but using disparate approaches.
This conceptual gap obstructs the stated
goals of evolutionary biologists; a recent
survey of evolutionary biologists and
ecologists reveals that the community
wants more interaction between theoreti-
cal and empirical research than is current-
ly perceived to occur [16].
To promote this interaction, we clarify
the role of mathematical models in
evolutionary biology. First, we briefly
describe how models fall along a contin-
uum from those designed for quantitative
prediction to abstract models of biological
processes. Then, we highlight the unique
utility of proof-of-concept models, at the
far end of this continuum of abstraction,
presenting several examples. We stress that
the development of rigorous analytical
theory with proof-of-concept models is
itself a test of verbal hypotheses [11,17],
and can in fact be as strong a test as an
elegant experiment.
Degrees of Abstraction in
Evolutionary Theory
Good evolutionary theory always de-
rives its motivation from the natural world
Essays articulate a specific perspective on a topic of
broad interest to scientists.
Citation: Servedio MR, Brandvain Y, Dhole S, Fitzpatrick CL, Goldberg EE, et al. (2014) Not Just a Theory—The
Utility of Mathematical Models in Evolutionary Biology. PLoS Biol 12(12): e1002017. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.
1002017
Published December 9, 2014
Copyright:  2014 Servedio et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: MRS was supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) grants DEB-0919018 and DEB-
1255777, and CF and JV were supported by the National Evolutionary Synthesis Center (NESCent), NSF EF-
0423641. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* Email: servedio@email.unc.edu
PLOS Biology | www.plosbiology.org 1 December 2014 | Volume 12 | Issue 12 | e1002017
and relates its conclusions back to biolog-
ical questions. Building such theory re-
quires different degrees of biological ab-
straction depending on the specific
question. Some questions are best ad-
dressed by building models to interface
directly with data. For example, DNA
substitution models in molecular evolution
can be built to take into account the
biochemistry of DNA, including variation
in guanine and cytosine (GC) content [18]
and the structure of the genetic code [19].
These substitution models form the basis
of the likelihood functions used to infer
phylogenetic relationships from sequence
data. Models can also provide baseline
expectations against which to compare
empirical observations (e.g., coalescent
genealogies under simple demographic
histories [20] or levels of genetic diversity
around selective sweeps [21]).
In contrast, higher degrees of abstrac-
tion are required when models are built to
qualitatively, as opposed to quantitatively,
describe a set of processes and their
expected outcomes. Though not mathe-
matical, verbal or pictorial models have
long been used in evolutionary biology to
form abstract hypotheses about processes
that operate among diverse species and
across vast time scales. Darwin’s [22]
theory of natural selection represents one
such model, and many others have
followed since; for example, Muller
proposed that genetic recombination
might evolve to prevent the buildup of
deleterious mutations (‘‘Muller’s ratchet’’)
[23], and the ‘‘Red Queen hypothesis’’
proposes that coevolution between antag-
onistically interacting species can proceed
without either species achieving a long-
term increase in fitness [24]. A clear verbal
model lays out explicitly which biological
factors and processes it is (and is not)
considering and follows a chain of logic
from these initial assumptions to conclu-
sions about how these factors interact to
produce biological patterns.
However, evolutionary processes and
the resulting patterns are often complex,
and there is much room for error and
oversight in verbal chains of logic. In fact,
verbal models often derive their influence
by functioning as lightning rods for debate
about exactly which biological factors and
processes are (or should be) under consid-
eration and how they will interact over
time. At this stage, a mathematical fram-
ing of the verbal model becomes invalu-
able. It is this proof-of-concept modeling
on which we focus below.
Proof-of-Concept Models:
Testing Verbal Logic in
Evolutionary Biology
Proof-of-concept models, used in many
fields, test the validity of verbal chains of
logic by laying out the specific assumptions
mathematically. The results that follow
from these assumptions emerge through
the principles of mathematics, which
reduces the possibility of logical errors at
this step of the process. The appropriate-
ness of the assumptions is critical, but once
they are established, the mathematical
analysis provides a precise mapping to
their consequences.
A clear analogy exists between proof-of-
concept models and other forms of
hypothesis testing. In general, the hypoth-
eses generated by verbal models must
ultimately be tested as part of the scientific
process (Figure 1A). Empirical research
tests a hypothesis by gathering data in
order to determine whether those data
match predicted outcomes (Figure 1B).
Proof-of-concept models function very
similarly (Figure 1C): to test the validity
of a verbal model, precise predictions from
a mathematical analysis of the assump-
tions are compared against verbal predic-
tions. This important function of mathe-
matical modeling is commonly
misunderstood, as theoreticians are often
asked how they might test their proof-of-
concept models empirically. The models
themselves are tests of whether verbal
models are sound; if their predictions do
Figure 1. Parallels between empirical experimental techniques and proof-of-concept
modeling in the scientific process. This flowchart shows the steps in the scientific process,
emphasizing the relationship between experimental empirical techniques and proof-of-concept
modeling. Other approaches, including ones that combine empirical and mathematical
techniques, are not shown. We note that some questions are best addressed by one or the
other of these techniques, while others might benefit from both approaches. Proof-of-concept
models, for example, are best suited to testing the logical correctness of verbal hypotheses (i.e.,
whether certain assumptions actually lead to certain predictions), while only empirical
approaches can address hypotheses about which assumptions are most commonly met in
nature. (A) A general description of the scientific process. (B) Steps in the scientific process as
approached by experimental empirical techniques. In this case, statistical techniques are often
used to analyze the gathered data. (C) Steps in the scientific process as approached by proof-of-
concept modeling. Here, techniques such as invasion and stability analyses, stochastic
simulations, and numerical analyses are employed to analyze the expected outcomes of a
model. In both cases, the hypothesis can be evaluated by comparing the results of the analyses to
the original predictions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1002017.g001
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not match, the verbal model is flawed, and
that form of the hypothesis is disproved.
That is not to say, however, that proof-
of-concept models do not need to interact
with natural systems or with empirical
work; in fact, quite the contrary is true.
There are vital links between theory and
natural systems at the assumption stage
(Box 1), and there can also be important
connections at the predictions stage (Box
2); connections also occur at the discussion
stage, where empirical results are synthe-
sized into a broader conceptual frame-
work. Additionally, theoretical models
often point to promising new directions
for empirical research, even if these
models do not provide immediately test-
able predictions (see below). When empir-
ical results run counter to theoretical
expectations, theorists and empiricists
have an opportunity to discover unknown
or underappreciated phenomena with
potentially important consequences.
Proof-of-concept models can both bring
to light hidden assumptions present in
verbal models and generate counterintui-
tive predictions. When a verbal model is
converted into a mathematical one, casual
or implicit assumptions must be made
explicit; in doing so, any unintended
assumptions are revealed. Once these
hidden assumptions are altered or re-
moved, the predicted outcomes and re-
sulting inferences of the formal model may
differ from, or even contradict, those of the
verbal model (Box 3). This benefit of
mathematical models has brought clarity
and transparency to virtually all fields of
evolutionary biology. Additionally, in spite
of their abstract simplicity, proof-of-con-
cept models, much like simple, elegant
experiments, have the capacity to surprise.
Even formalizations of seemingly straight-
forward verbal models can yield outcomes
that are unanticipated using a verbal chain
of logic (Box 4). Proof-of-concept models
thus have the ability both to reinforce the
foundations of evolutionary explanations





Proof-of-concept models have proven to
be an essential tool for investigating some
of the classic and most enduring puzzles in
the study of evolutionary biology, such as
‘‘why is there sex?’’ and ‘‘how do new
species originate?’’ These areas of research
remain highly active in part because the
relevant time scales are long and the
processes are intricate. They represent
Box 1. A Critical Connection—Assumptions
Although the steps between assumptions and predictions in proof-of-concept
models do not need to be empirically tested, empirical support is essential to
ensure that key assumptions of mathematical models are biologically realistic.
The process of matching assumptions to data is a two-way street; if a model
demonstrates that a certain assumption is very important, it should motivate
empirical work to see if it is met. Importantly, however, not all assumptions must
be fully realistic for a model to inform our understanding of the natural world.
We can group assumptions into three general categories (with some overlap
between them): we name these 1) critical, 2) exploratory, and 3) logistical. Critical
assumptions are those that are integral to the hypothesis, analogous to the factors
that an empirical scientist varies in an experiment (they would be part of the purple
‘‘hypothesis’’ box of Figure 1). These assumptions are crucial in order to properly
test the verbal model; if they do not match the intent of the verbal hypothesis, then
the mathematical model is not a true test of the verbal one. To illustrate this
category of assumptions (and those below), consider the mathematical model by
Rice [35], which tests the verbal model that ‘‘antagonistic selection between the
sexes can maintain sexual dimorphism.’’ In this model, assumptions that fall into
the critical category are that (i) antagonistic selection at a locus results in higher
fitness for alternate alleles in each sex, and (ii) sexual dimorphism results from a
polymorphism between these alleles. If critical assumptions cannot be supported
by underlying data or observation, and are therefore biologically unrealistic, then
the entire modeling exercise is devoid of biological meaning [36].
The second category, exploratory assumptions, may be important to vary and
test, but are not at the core of the verbal hypothesis. These assumptions are
analogous to factors that an empiricist wishes to control for, but that are not the
primary variables. Examining the effects of these assumptions may give new
insights and breadth to our understanding of a biological phenomenon. (These
assumptions, and those below, might best fit in the blue ‘‘assumptions’’ box of
Figure 1C.) Returning to Rice’s [35] model of sexual dimorphism, two exploratory
assumptions are the dominance relationship between the alleles under
antagonistic selection and whether the locus is autosomal or sex linked. Analysis
of the model shows that dominance does not affect the conditions for sexual
dimorphism when the locus is autosomal, but it does when the locus is sex linked.
Finally, every mathematical modeling exercise requires that logistical assumptions
be made. These assumptions are partly necessary for tractability. Additionally,
proof-of-concept models in evolutionary biology, as in other fields, are not meant
to replicate the real world; their purpose instead is to identify the effects of
certain assumptions (critical and exploratory ones) by isolating them and placing
them in a simplified and abstract context. A key to creating a meaningful model is
to be certain that logistical assumptions made to reduce complexity do not
qualitatively alter the model’s results. In many cases, theoreticians know enough
about the effects of an assumption to be able to make it safely. In Rice’s [35]
sexual dimorphism example, the logistical assumptions include random mating,
infinitely large population size, and nonoverlapping generations. These are
common and well-understood assumptions in many population genetic models.
In other cases, the robustness of logistical assumptions must be tested in a
specific model to understand their effects in that context. Because assumptions in
mathematical models are explicit, potential limitations in applicability caused by
the remaining assumptions can be identified; it is important that modelers
acknowledge the potential effects of relaxing these assumptions to make these
issues more transparent. As with the other categories of assumptions above,
logistical assumptions have an analogy in empirical work; many experiments are
conducted in lab environments, or under altered field conditions, with the same
purpose of reducing biological complexity to pinpoint specific effects.
Much of the doubt about the applicability of models may stem from a mistrust of
the effects of logistical assumptions. It is the responsibility of the theoretician to
make his or her knowledge of the robustness of these assumptions transparent to
the reader; it may not always be obvious which assumptions are critical versus
logistical, and whether the effects of the latter are known. It is likewise the
responsibility of the empirically-minded reader to approach models with the
same open mind that he or she would an experiment in an artificial setting, rather
than immediately dismiss them because of the presence of logistical assumptions.
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excellent examples of topics in which
mathematical approaches allow investiga-
tors to explore the effects of biologically
complex factors that are difficult or
impossible to manipulate experimentally.
Why Is There Sex?
A century after Darwin [25] published
his comprehensive treatment of sexual
reproduction, John Maynard Smith [26]
used a simple mathematical formalization
to identify a biological paradox: why is
sexual reproduction ubiquitous, given that
asexual organisms can reproduce at a
higher rate than sexual ones by not
producing males (the ‘‘2-fold cost of
sex’’)? Increased genetic variation resulting
from sexual reproduction is widely
thought to counteract this cost, but simple
proof-of-concept models quickly revealed
both a flaw in this verbal logic and an
unexpected outcome: sex need not in-
crease variation, and even when it does,
the increased variation need not increase
fitness [27]. Subsequent theoretical work
has illuminated many factors that facilitate
the evolution and maintenance of sex.
Otto and Nuismer [28], for example, used
a population genetic model to examine the
effects on the evolution of sex of antago-
nistic interactions between species. Such
interactions were long thought to facilitate
the evolution of sex [29,30]. They found,
however, that these interactions only select
for sex under particular circumstances that
are probably relatively rare. Although
these predictions might be difficult to test
empirically, their implications are impor-
tant for our conceptual understanding of
the evolution of sex.
How Do New Species Originate?
Speciation is another research area
that has benefitted from extensive
proof-of-concept modeling. Even under
the conditions most unfavorable to speci-
ation (e.g., continuous contact between
individuals from diverging types), one can
weave plausible-sounding verbal specia-
tion scenarios [22]. Verbal models, how-
ever, can easily underestimate the strength
of biological factors that maintain species
cohesion (e.g., gene flow and genetic
constraints). Mathematical models have
allowed scientists to explicitly outline the
parameter space in which speciation can
and cannot occur, highlighting many
critical determinants of the speciation
process that were previously unrecognized
[31]. Felsenstein [32], for example, revo-
lutionized our understanding of the diffi-
culties of speciation with gene flow by
using a proof-of-concept model to identify
hitherto unconsidered genetic constraints.
Speciation models in general have made it
clear that the devil is in the details; there
are many important biological conditions
that combine to determine whether speci-
ation is more or less likely to occur.
Because speciation is exceedingly difficult
to replicate experimentally, theoretical
developments such as these have been
particularly valuable.
Pitfalls and Promise
Although mathematical models are
potentially enlightening, they share with
experimental tests the danger of possible
overinterpretation. Mathematical models
can clearly outline the parameter space in
which an evolutionary phenomenon such
as speciation or the evolution of sex can
occur under certain assumptions, but is
this space ‘‘big’’ or ‘‘little’’? As with any
scientific study, the impression that a
model leaves can be misleading, either
through faults in the presentation or
improper citation in subsequent literature.
Overgeneralization from what a model
actually investigates, and claims to
Box 2. The Complete Picture—Testing Predictions
The predictions of some proof-of-concept models can be evaluated empirically.
These tests are not ‘‘tests of the model’’; the model is correct in that its
predictions follow mathematically from its assumptions. They are, though, tests of
the relevance or applicability of the model to empirical systems, and in that sense
another way of testing whether the assumptions of the model are met in nature
(i.e., an indirect test of the assumptions).
A well-known example of an empirical test of theoretically-derived predictions
arises in local mate competition theory, which makes predictions about the sex
ratio females should produce in their offspring in order to maximize fitness in
structured populations, based on the intensity of local competition for mates [37].
These predictions have been assessed, for example, using experimental evolution
in spider mites (Tetranychus urticae) [38]. The predictions of other evolutionary
models might be best suited to comparative tests rather than tests in a single
system. For example, inclusive fitness models suggest that, all else being equal,
cooperation will be most likely to evolve within groups of close kin [6]. In support
of this idea, comparative analyses suggest that mating with a single male
(monandry), rather than polyandry, was the ancestral state for eusocial
hymenoptera, meaning that this extreme form of cooperation arose within
groups of full siblings [39].
In other cases, comparative data might be very difficult to collect. Theoretical
models, for example, have demonstrated that speciation is greatly facilitated if
isolating mechanisms that occur before and after mating are controlled by the
same genes (e.g., are pleiotropic) [40]. While this condition is found in an
increasing number of case studies [41], each case requires manipulative tests of
selection and/or identification of specific genes, so that a rigorous comparative
test of how often such pleiotropy is involved in speciation remains far in the
future.
Box 3. Uncovering Hidden Assumptions
A striking example of the utility of mathematical models comes from the
literature on the evolution of indiscriminate altruism (the provision of benefits to
others, at a cost to oneself, without discriminating between partners who
cooperate and partners who do not). Hamilton [6] proposed that indiscriminate
altruism can evolve in a population if individuals are more likely to interact with
kin. He also suggested that population viscosity—the limited dispersal of
individuals from their birthplace—can increase the probability of interacting with
kin. For a long time after Hamilton’s original work, it was assumed, often without
any explicit justification, that limited dispersal alone could facilitate the evolution
of altruism [42]. A simple mathematical model by Taylor [43], however, showed
that population viscosity alone cannot facilitate the evolution of altruism, because
the benefits of close proximity to kin are exactly balanced by the costs of
competition with those kin. Taylor’s model revealed the importance of kin
competition and clarified that additional assumptions about life history, such as
age structure and the timing of dispersal relative to reproduction, are required for
population viscosity to promote (or even inhibit) the evolution of altruism.
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investigate, is strikingly common in this
age when time for reading is short [33],
and this problem is exacerbated when the
presentation is not accessible to readers
with a more limited background in
theoretical analysis [34]. Indeed, these
problems, universal to many fields of
science, introduce the greatest potential
for error in the conclusions that the
research community draws from evolu-
tionary theory.
We follow this word of caution with a
final positive thought: in addition to the
roles of mathematical models in testing
verbal logic, the ability of theory to
circumvent practical obstructions of ex-
perimental tractability in order to tackle
virtually any problem is a benefit that
should not be underestimated. Science is
a quest for knowledge, and if a problem
is, at least currently, empirically intrac-
table, it is very unsatisfactory to collec-
tively throw up our hands and accept
ignorance. Surely it is far better, in such
cases, to use mathematical models to
explore how evolution might have pro-
ceeded, illuminating the conditions un-
der which certain evolutionary paths are
possible.
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Box 4. A Proof-of-Concept Model Finds a Flaw and Introduces a
New Twist
In stalk-eyed flies, males’ exaggerated eyestalks play two roles in sexual selection:
they are used in male–male competition and are the object of female choice.
Researchers noticed that generations of experimental selection for less
exaggerated eyestalks resulted in males that fathered proportionally fewer sons
than expected [44]. Both verbal intuition and preliminary evidence led the
research group to propose that females preferred males with long eyestalks
because this exaggerated trait resided on a Y chromosome that was resistant to
an X chromosome driver with biased transmission [45]. However, a proof-of-
concept model highlighted the flawed logic of this verbal model; the
mathematical model showed that females choosing to mate with males bearing
a drive-resistant Y chromosome (as putatively indicated by long eyestalks) would
have lower fitness than nonchoosy females, and therefore this preference would
not evolve [46]. In contrast, female choice for long eyestalks could be favored if
long eyestalks were genetically associated with a nondriving allele at the (X-
linked) drive locus [46], so long as the eyestalk-length and drive loci were tightly
linked [47]. These proof-of-concept models provided a new direction for empirical
work, leading to the collection of new evidence demonstrating that the X-driver is
linked to the eyestalk-length locus by an inversion [48], with the nondriver and
long eyestalk in coupling phase (i.e., on the same haplotype).
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